South Carolina Law Review
Volume 31

Issue 3

Article 7

1980

A Comment on Neumeier
Maurice Rosenberg
Columbia University School of law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Rosenberg, Maurice (1980) "A Comment on Neumeier," South Carolina Law Review: Vol. 31 : Iss. 3 , Article
7.
Available at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol31/iss3/7

This Symposium Paper is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more
information, please contact digres@mailbox.sc.edu.

Rosenberg: A Comment on Neumeier

A COMMENT ON Neumeier
MAURICE ROSENBERG*

This talk will be a comment on the Neumeier' case in light
of choice-influencing considerations and in light of what Professor
Leflar said about Neumeier in the Law and Contemporary
Problems article which he calls, as you remember, Choice of Law:
A Well-Watered Plateau.2 What I am going to say actually could
be subtitled "Are the Courts Going to Carve a Butte out of the
Plateau?" I want to explain the pedigree of that subtitle, but
before doing so I would like to say a few things about Robert
Leflar.
He is a very rare type. He is one of the few people for whom
it is genuinely impossible to list all achievements. It is even difficult just to inventory the areas his work has touched. He has the
habit of periodically announcing his retirement from this or that.
Younger people (which includes quite a lot of people) do not know
whether to be glad of that or not. They are glad to be rid of the
competition but they look at the gap he leaves when he retires
from something and they wonder how they are ever going to take
up the slack.
Of all the qualities of mind and heart Professor Leflar has, I
suppose that close to number one is the talent he has for clarity
and for organizing and presenting ideas, whether his own or someone else's, in a coherent way. If you ever want to know how to find
a path through the befuddlement that other academicians and
courts will lead you into in choice of law or jurisdiction, the way
to do it is to pick up an exposition by Leflar. He has an unerring
sense of getting to the bottom of things and getting there in a
straightforward and clear fashion. In addition to the enormous
substantive contributions he has made by advancing powerful
ideas in this field and by favoring us with the third edition of his
fine treatise on conflicts,3 he has put us all in his debt for a lesson
he always teaches without making a special point of it: the lesson
* Harold R. Medina Professor of Procedural Jurisprudence, Columbia University
School of Law. A.B., Syracuse University, 1940; LL.B., Columbia University, 1947.
1. Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972).
2. Leflar, Choice of Law: A Well-Watered Plateau,LAw & CoNrmmp. PROB. 10 (Spring
1977).
3. R. LEFLAR, AaamcAN CONFLICTS LAW (3d ed. 1977).
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is to be clear and straightforward in whatever you say.
Now, let us get to his "Well-Watered Plateau" article and to
my subtitle about the plateau's possible erosion into a butte as a
result of action by the courts. The reason for the subtitle is to
register doubt about what he says in the article-namely, that
things have pretty well settled down in the choice-of-law area
these days; and the courts, instead of beating around the Bealian
bushes down in the lowlands and in the swamps, are now on the
great sunlit uplands of a plateau that Leflar characterized as
well-watered, especially by Dave Cavers, who has taught us about
principles of preference.' To that last I say "Amen." It is my view
that in this generation those two people, Leflar and Cavers, have
made the most enduring contributions of anybody to the conflicts
area. This statement does not exclude Professor Currie and the
redoubtable work he has done.
Leflar said in his article that although academic writers keep
stirring the ashes, the courts have found a certain measure of
peace in choice of law. 5 He declared that judges do not ordinarily
employ today a single modern theory of choice of law but a
blend-like a good coffee, I suppose-of a number of modern
theories. These are nonmechanical and they include such theories
as the second conflicts Restatement's most-significantrelationship approach, 6 Cavers' principles of preference, 7 the
governmental-interest approach,' and preference for the forum's
law.' Modestly, he tucks in, without attribution, choiceinfluencing considerations. We know that many courts, led by
Minnesota, are appl iing those considerations.' 0 Finally, his article says, even the dominant contacts theory is used.' 1 The courts
then mix and match these approaches as they go along, using
several of them in the same decision without much discrimination
among them and without any effort to reach analytically pure
streams of reasoning on their way to a decision.
Then onto this serene and civilized well-watered plateau
4. D. CAvERS, THE CHOICE-OF-LAw PROCESS 114-224 (1965).

5. Leflar, supra note 2, at 10.
6. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAwS §

145 (1971).

7. D. CAVERS, supra note 4, at 139, 181.
8. B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON Tim CoNFucr OF LAWS 183-84 (1963).
9. A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 309-16 (1962).

10. See, e.g., Myers v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 302 Minn. 359, 225 N.W.2d
238 (1974); Milkovich v. Saari, 295 Minn. 155, 203 N.W.2d 408 (1973).
11. Leflar, supra note 2, at 15-16.
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there comes the sad state of New York, the fly in the ointment.
Whereas, writes Leflar, any and all of the collection of modern
theories that are used by the courts which are no longer benighted
will lead you pretty much to the same decision'-that is, to the
same conclusion in the end as to who should win-New York,
even though its views are modern, does not reach the right outcome. He asserts that "only states like New York would be so
bedeviled by opposing academic theories that, attempting analytical integrity, they would let results be much affected by shifting from one modern approach to another."' 3 As an aside, let me
say that we New Yorkers do not spurn any accusation of
"integrity," even though modified by "analytical." Hence, I
gratefully accept the accusation on behalf of New York.
Be that as it may, Leflar views New York's approach to
choice of law as more unsatisfactory than that of any other state 4
that has thrown off the yoke of the first Restatement's Bealian
mechanics. As exemplifying New York's disreputable efforts he
points us to Neumeier1 5 and Rosenthal v. Warren.16 Neumeier is,
of course, Judge Stanley Fuld's elaboration of the line of thinking
in choice of law that he began in 1954 in Auten," and carried to
a high point in Babcock'8 in 1963. Professor Leflar regards
Neumeier as one of the pieces of skull-duggery that New Yorkers
perpetrated, and the Second Circuit's 1973 decision in Rosenthal
v. Warren as the other. He says these two cases show the selfcentered nature of the New York position. 9 That means, he explains, that New York's governmental interests are made to coincide with the interests of the New York resident in these cases.2 0
Thus, it is a very parochial, a very home-town favoring, type of
approach. The assertion is that when nonresidents are involved
in the case, the New York resident wins.
Now, as a New York resident-although I am out of residence
this year-I could almost wish that were so, but that is not the
way I read the Neumeier case. Specifically, under Fuld's second
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id. at 11.
Id. at 11-12.
Id. at 21.
Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972).
475 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1973).
Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954).
Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
Leflar, supra note 2, at 20.
Id. at 20-21.
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guideline in the Neumeier case, it is made explicitly clear that if
a New Yorker is a guest in a car driven by a non-New York
resident and the injury occurs in the driver's state, the New York
guest will have to satisfy the driver-state's standard of negligence
to prevail in a New York court.' That is, a person residing in a
guest-statute state driving a car there wins against the New York
resident. It is clear that the Neumeier case is not so parochial that
it decrees a New Yorker will always prevail whatever the combination of law and fact.
On the other hand, there is basis for ascribing the homefavoring philosophy to Rosenthal v. Warren, but I am convinced
that Rosenthal misreads and misapplies Neumeier. Those, I
might say, are the kindest words I can think of to say about
Rosenthal. The rest is unprintable, in my opinion.
Now let me turn to Neumeier, which, I hope, is the handsome
shape of things to come in choice of law in the not too distant
future. I am always bemused by the fact that courts have so much
difficulty following Neumeier, that is, in reading and understanding it easily. It seems plain enough that the decision is a clear
response to an obvious need in choice of law-the need to find a
proper line between unreasonable rules on one side and unruly
reasonableness on the other side. You have to have rules in the
end, it seems to me; the question is whether we can arrive at some
reasonable rules as we go along.
At this point, we have to take a short ride on the way to
Neumeier through well-known New York guest-statute cases in
order for you to see 'what Judge Fuld was doing when that case
came to him. I should say that I clerked for Judge Fuld for a
couple of years and I think I know a bit about the workings of his
mind. Additionally, I have had many conversations with him
about these cases. Starting in 1963 with Babcock and continuing
to 1969, New York had a machine-gun-like staccatto succession
of guest-statute cases in a way that really was quite disgraceful.
In Babcock,2" in 1963, Fuld used the interest analysis to arrive at
a three-ply approach to choice-of-law cases involving guest-host
liability in multistate situations. He said, first of all, the interest
of the place of wrong in regulating the rules of conduct and
standards of due care made it almost unthinkable that any state
21. 31 N.Y.2d at 128, 286 N.E.2d at 457-58, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 70.
22. Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
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other than the state of the place of wrong would govern those
matters involving the driver's due care.2 Thus, the law of the
state of wrong has priority in matters involving the driver's due
care and standard of conduct. The interest approach is the route
for selecting that state's rule: the state of the wrong has the
greatest interest in governing those matters.
Secondly, said Judge Fuld, the place where the guest-host
relationship arose is appropriate to govern legal issues that arise
out of the relationship. 4 That view is arrived at by application
of the interest analysis. From that approach we know that when
a car starts out with a guest and host in it, the state they start in
is the seat of the relationship. It seems from Babcock that it will
be the law of that place that will govern issues arising out of that
relationship from then on.
The third principle that emerges from Babcock is that remaining issues will be determined according to the law of the
state that has the most interest in the particular issue presented. 25
There you have the three-ply approach of Babcock. All three
propositions in the end rest less on the dominant-contact idea
than on the question of which state has the greater interest in the
matter.
Two years later, in 1965, came the Colorado guest-host statute case, Dym v. Gordon;26 here the court split four to three. This
time, it is fair to say, the seat-of-the-relationship idea was in the
saddle. The majority of the court said that since Colorado was the
seat of the relationship its guest statute would apply, even as
between the guest and host New Yorkers involved in the accident.
The next year brought Macy v. Rozbicki, 21 another case involving the seat of the relationship, with the "seat" riding very
high. Through the pen of Chief Judge Desmond, the court said
that although the relationship was formed in New York and not
in Ontario, the relationship of importance was that the two parties were sisters." By playing that pun upon the "relationship"
of the parties as sisters in New York and disregarding their relationship as host and guest in an automobile, Judge Desmond was
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

12 N.Y.2d at 483, 191 N.E.2d at 284, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 750-51.
Id. at 483-84, 191 N.E.2d at 284-85, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 751.
Id. at 484, 191 N.E.2d at 285, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 752.
16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965).
18 N.Y.2d 289, 221 N.E.2d 380, 274 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1966).
Id. at 291-92, 221 N.E.2d at 381-82, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 592-93.
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able to refer the case to New'York and to apply the New York
common-law rule instead of the rule of Ontario, where the plaintiff acutally got into the car with her sister, the driver."
In 1969 the fourth of the guest-host cases came along, Tooker
v. Lopez,3" and the "seat" of the relationship dropped away completely. Since Tooker, no one has been interested in locating the
seat of the relationship, either with respect to the parties' guesthost relationship or their kinship relationship; interest analysis
has become the basis on which the cases are decided. At the time
of the Tooker decision, Judge Fuld had reached the conclusion
that it was unduly monotonous to have been required to decide
four guest-statute cases in six years at the highest level of the
state's judicial system. He tried, in a concurring opinion in
Tooker, to reason his way to a few principles that would apply in
future cases, making it unnecessary to litigate other guest-statute
cases all the way to the highest court. His views attracted no
colleagues at that time. It was several years before the next case,
Neumeier, came along and he was able to get a court for his view.
In sum, in his 1969 concurrence in the Tooker case (involving the
two New York girls who went to Michigan State University and
were in a fatal highway accident in Michigan), Judge Fuld set the
stage for his guideline approach; you could say he gave the idea
of guidelines a tryout in Michigan and then "put it on the road"
in Ontario in the Neumeier case, there attracting four other
judges to his position.
The three guidelines that emerged are well known. First, if
the guest and host are from the same state and the car is registered there, the law of that state will apply whether it is the
common-law rule or the guest-statute rule.3' Second, if the guest
is hurt in a state that has a guest statute and the driver is from
that state and driving in that state, the guest statute will apply
even though the guest comes from a common-law state; that is,
a guest does not carry the common-law rule with him when he
goes into a guest-statute state and the driver does not carry his
guest law with him when he goes into a common-law state and
injury results in that other state.21 The third principle is that
when the fact pattern is different from those enumerated we have
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id.
24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969).
31 N.Y.2d at 128, 286 N.E.2d at 457, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 70.
Id.
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to be less categorical; a presumption is created for the applicability of the liability rule of the state where the accident happened,
but that presumption can be displaced if good reason is shown
why it should be displaced. 3 An example of a good reason is
showing that displacing the presumption in favor of the lex loci
is consonant with underlying substantive law purposes that are
involved and will not create needless uncertainty. This third
guideline is obviously plastic; it will have to be given firmer shape
and meaning as we get more cases of this kind. 4
There are several things that are important to notice about
Neumeier, by way of appreciating what Judge Fuld was trying to
do. First, he wanted to end the absurdity of making ad hoc decisions case by case in the guest-host situations.3 5 He thought that
too much was enough, as he had said in Tooker, and that it was
time to blow the whistle and try to develop a systematic approach. The systematic approach he arrived at was based upon
analysis of the underlying purposes and objectives in the guest
statutes and comparison of them with the purposes of the
common-law rule. He believed the guidelines he developed did
take account in proper fashion of what might be called governmental interests, that is, purposes and objectives underlying substantive rules of law.3 But he thought that it was time to call a
halt to the parade of guest-statute cases. It was perhaps analogous to the situation of the Englishman who was sailing on the
Titanic. The waiter handed him his drink and he said, "I know
I ordered ice, but this is absurd." New York was in something
like that situation.
Notice also how Judge Fuld proposed to put a cap on the
guest-statute cases. Babcock and its progeny, he said, helped us
to see the underlying values-the underlying policies, purposes,
and objectives-that were operative in this field of law. Now that
they are revealed, his argument proceeds, it is time for us to use
them in order to fashion guidelines that will help in future cases
33. Id.
34. Neumeier v. Kuehner was the subject of extensive comment in the periodical
literature, including a symposium entitled Neumeier v. Kuehner: A Conflicts Conflict, 1
HOFSTRA L. REV. 93 (1973). See also Hancock, Some Choice of Law Problems Posed by
Anti-Guest Statutes: Realism in Wisconsin and Rule Fetishism in New York, 27 STAN. L.
REV. 775 (1975); Trautman, Rule or Reason in Choice of Law: A Comment on Neumeier,
1 VT. L. REV. 1 (1976).

35. 31 N.Y.2d at 127, 286 N.E.2d at 457, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 69.
36. Id. at 126, 286 N.E.2d at 456, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 68.

Published by Scholar Commons, 1980

7

South
Carolina
Law Review,
Iss. 3 [1980], Art. 7[Vol.
RE31,
ViEw
LAWVol.
SOUTH
CAROLINA

31

so that the litigants can know what the outcome is likely to be
without having to litigate all the way to the highest court in the
state each time."
The third point about Judge Fuld's approach is one that is
missed most often by the courts and commentators. The Fuld
opinion explicitly limited these guidelines to guest-host cases.',
True, it may be disagreeable to be unable to extrapolate and
generalize these guidelines as if they covered wrongful-death
damage cases or comparative contributory negligence cases or
sundry other torts cases. It is sort of vexing to be told we shall
have to learn pin-point rules instead of global principles, and that
the rules will not hold as we move from one problem to another
and from one area to another. But that, I am bound to say, is the
very nature and essence of the governmental interest or purposebehind-the-rule analysis. It is essential to learn what the competing purposes are and to fashion a choice-of-law standard sensitive
to those competing purposes. Obviously, as we move from one
problem to another the underlying purposes change and compel
us to formulate different rules in resolving the clashes of values
that result. That is why Judge Fuld was careful to say that these
guidelines are limited to "situations involving guest statutes in
conflicts settings."39 They therefore may not be used in an allpurpose way.
What has happened since Neumeier? Three things. First, the
flood of automobile guest-host cases in the New York Court of
Appeals has subsided to a drip-it is no longer even a trickle. As
a matter of fact, there has only been one guest-statute case of the
kind we are discussing. The change in quantity has been dramatic: there were four in six years, a fifth just three years later,
and then six years with no similar case.
In 1976 came Toweley v. King Arthur Rings,4" involving a
Colorado accident, but there was no difficulty at all so far as
concerns the applicability of the Neumeier principles. The court
was sidetracked on the question whether plaintiff should have
had a chance to show that the driver had been negligent within
the meaning of the Colorado "wanton and willful" guest statute.
That is the only guest-host case in the more than six years since
37. Id. at 128, 286 N.E.2d at 457, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 69.

38. Id.
39. Id.
40. 40 N.Y.2d 129, 351 N.E.2d 728, 386 N.Y.S.2d 80 (1976).
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Neumeier; it represents quite a change from the drumfire that
preceded. Of course, it may only be the phenomenon of the
"Smokey the Bear" subway posters in New York: there has not
been a single forest fire in New York City since those posters went
up. Neumeier may likewise have had little to do with the near
absence of guest cases since it was announced; on the other hand,
it may be responsible.
A second thing to observe is the impact of Neumeier in the
lower courts. It has been mentioned in seventeen cases in those
courts. The mentions have been honorable for the most part;
sometimes they have even been relevant, itself an accomplishment. None of the decisions presented serious difficulties or required attention of the court of appeals in-order to be put to rest.
Third, research by computer reveals that in the federal
courts there have been fifteen "level one documents"-which
turn out to be cited cases, of all things. Of the fifteen citations to
Neumeier in the federal courts, some are misapplications. For
example, there is Rosenthal v. Warren,4' where the court cited
and treated Neumeier as if it had left untouched the plaintiff
favoritism that was revealed by the predecessor cases, notably
Tooker." Rosenthal was wrong to speak as if Neumeier had left
intact the attitude of the court of appeals of the state that New
York residents deserve to win almost ipso facto. Rosenthal misreads Neumeier to think it leaves, in full force, Miller,43 Tooker,4
Kilberg4 5 and some of the other famous decisions that favored
New York residents.
Outside New York, the federal courts have not done anything
with or to Neumeier that would boggle a conflicts teacher's mind.
The case has had a mixed reception. The year after it was decided, Colorado approved two of its principles46 while Rhode Island disapproved all three. 7 I do not think you can draw any
conclusions about its overall impact in the provinces outside New
York from the evidence so far at hand.
41. 475 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1973).
42. See id. at 442.
43. Miller v. Miller, 22 N.Y.2d 12, 237 N.E.2d 877, 290 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1968).
44. Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969).
45. Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d
133 (1961).
46. First Nat'l Bank v. Rostek, 182 Colo. 437, 514 P.2d 314 (1973).
47. Labree v. Major, 111 R.I. 657, 306 A.2d 808 (1973).
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David Cavers, in his Choice-of-Law Process,48 put up some
hypotheticals, as you remember, and asked various people to decide them as if they were judges. One of the hypothetical problems that he outlined seems to me to be the cutting edge of all
our thinking here. It was his "Case of the Nantucket Banker."
You know that Nantucket is a Massachusetts island, a summer
resort. Cavers postulates that to Nantucket one summer comes a
New York tourist. A local banker, a Massachusettsan, in the days
when Massachusetts had a limit of $15,000 on wrongful-death
damages, bicycling to work one day, runs into the New York
tourist and kills him. In some fashion, the estate or the representative gets jurisdiction over the Nantucket banker in New York,
say, by serving him while he is flying over New York on his way
to Pittsburgh or Fayetteville. The question is: Can the Nantucket
banker be saddled with New York's sky-is-the-limit damages,
considering that the banker acted at home? He was not involved
in interstate commerce when he ran over the New Yorker, and he
had no reason to suspect that he was running over an expensive
New Yorker. Can he be mulcted in damages under the New York
rule?
That case arose in a slightly altered fashion in New York. A
New York court, the appellate division, decided the case and
overruled Home Insurance Co. v. Dick,49 at least in its hypothetical version. The case is one that is little known or remembered
except as a note in our casebook. It is called Tepkema v.
Kenney."0 The Tjepkema family was traveling across the country
and got as far as Missouri. In Missouri, their car broke down. Mr.
Tjepkema sought aid by crossing a well-traveled highway to make
a phone call. On his way back he was struck and killed by a
Missouri car. Jurisdiction was obtained by attaching the insurance company of the Missouri driver in New York by a Seidertype attachment."1 An attachment of the insurance company, Insurance Company of North America, was made in New York on
a claim for $100,000 in damages. Missouri at that time had a
$25,000 damage limit. Question: In those circumstances may New
York apply its sky-is-the-limit rule to attach a $100,000 policy on
48. D.

CAVERS, THE CHOICE-oF-LAw PROCESS (1965).

49. 281 U.S. 397 (1930)*
50. 31 A.D.2d 908, 298 N.Y.S.2d 175 (1969).
51. See Rosenberg, One ProceduralGenie Too Many or Putting Seider Back into its
Bottle, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 660 (1971).
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account of a $25,000-limit accident in Missouri? Answer: Yes.
The appellate division did it. It was not reviewed on appeal. I
have always thought that case would provide an acid test of how
far choice of law is today constitutionally restricted under Home
Insurance Co. v. Dick. The only contact with New York in the
case was that a New York resident was killed and New York
representatives were suing. That Missourian, so far as we know,
never heard of New York. Probably Illinois, but not New York.
That is the case.
Would the New York Court of Appeals have decided
O'Connorv. Lee-Hy Paving Corp.52 in the way the Second Circuit
did? The decedent was killed in Virginia, the circumstances being
that he was working in Virginia and was run over by a road grader
that belonged to defendant. The defendant was an all-Virginia
outfit. We can take it that, under the Virginia law that was applicable, there would have been no common-law liability; that
is, no damage liability because the decedent was killed by someone who would be regarded in Virginia as being in the same
employ as the tortfeasor.
In New York, the rule is the opposite. This looks like the
Nantucket banker case again; that is to say, we have here a
Virginia road-grading business operating at home. The only basis
for jurisdiction over it is that its insurance company was attached
in New York. That was the entire basis for jurisdiction in
O'Connor,as it was in Tjepkema and other cases. Thus, you have
again a case in which the sole material contact is the domicile of
the plaintiff. I think the New York Court of Appeals would have
said that it would be unfair and close to a due process violation
to apply the New York substantive law to a transaction in which
the defendant had so little to do with New York-just killing a
New Yorker. That is all. If that is enough, if killing a New Yorker
is enough to subject any defendant to New York law, wherever the
defendant acts, and particularly if the defendant acts at home,
then Home Insurance Co. v. Dick is a rather dead letter.
In O'Connorthere was no question of assignment or anything
else. That case suggests this problem: If New York can apply its
substantive law when a New Yorker is killed or injured in another
state by someone acting at home under a protective local rule,
suppose a non-New Yorker is killed in the same circumstances as
52. 579 F.2d 194 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 639 (1978).
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Mr. Tjepkema. Suppose further that his family moves to New
York afterward and starts suit obtaining jurisdiction by attaching
the defendant's insurance policy. The dilemma would be as follows: if Tjepkema is good law, will the New Yorker who moves
into the state after an out-of-state accident be treated differently
from a New Yorker who was already a resident in the state when
the out-of-state accident occurred? Will a non-New Yorker be
treated differently from a New Yorker in respect to whether New
York will apply its substantive law? You see the problem.
If you are of the view that Tjepkema and O'Connor are constitutional on the reasoning that contact with a New York resident is enough to satisfy the legislative jurisdiction requirements
of Home Insurance Co. v. Dick, you open the door to very grave
questions in cases where a non-New York resident is the plaintiff.
The first question is whether there is judicial jurisdiction in the
forum court to allow suit to go forward in the absence of personal
jurisdiction over the tortfeasor. Under the offspring of the Seider
decision, a negative answer has been given to that inquiry. But
presumably, that difficulty could be overcome by New York's
enacting a statute providing for a direct action against the insurer
of the injurer. If the insurance company does business in New
York, a direct action would probably be jurisdictionally permissible. However, the question would then arise whether the Home
Insurance Co. v. Dick limitation on the applicability of a forum's
decisional rules in a case having only wispy connections with the
forum prevents a Tjepkema or O'Connoroutcome when the plaintiff is a nonresident.
The dilemma thus posed is whether to apply different substantive rules to identically situated victims of injury arising from
out-of-state torts merely because one is a New York (or forum)
resident and the other is not. That would amount to outright
discrimination. On the other hand, to apply the same rule to the
nonresident might run into the constitutional difficulty exemplified in Home Insurance Co. v. Dick. Seemingly, the choice must
be between grave discrimination on the one hand and due process
insufficiency on the other hand. I take the view that the New
Yorker should not be treated differently. New York should not
apply its law in a case like Tjepkema on behalf of the New Yorker.
Returning to my main thesis, I would say that Neumeier
apart, recent court decisions do not bespeak an era of tranquility
and clarity in conflicts. The choice-of-law field. may be well-
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watered, but it is still full of ruts and furrows. These are created
by modernist courts such as California, which in September
1978, decided Offshore Rental Co. v. Continental Oil Co.," 3 a
decision weighing "comparative impairments." Similarly, the
Pancotto case was decided by our erstwhile colleague Prentice
Marshall, now a judge here in the northern district of Illinois. He
had terrible troubles with modern theories in that case. Mrs.
Pancotto and her family went on safari to Mozambique. Mrs.
Pancotto got out of her vehicle to take pictures of the assembled
hunters and was run over by a swamp-buggy belonging to the
Mozambique Safari Company. She sued in the northern district
of Illinois for her grievous personal injury. She was able to get
jurisdiction over the Mozambique Safari Company because it
solicited trade in the northern district, in addition to other places
in the country. The case came up on motion by the Safari Company to require that Mozambique law be applied to determine
liability and damages. The judge, Prentice Marshall, divided the
question into two parts. On liability he wrote a lengthy and
learned opinion in which he pointed out that, under the law of
Mozambique, the standard of care enjoined upon the defendant
was that owed by a male head of a family. This, you notice, was
a very sexist, "male chauvinist pig," kind of Portuguese rule. He
then decided that the liability rule that would apply to that Mozambique swamp-buggy accident under the Illinois choice-of-law
rule was the Mozambique standard, since that was the lex loci.
After deciding, under the interest analysis, that the Mozambique rule would apply, Judge Marshall said, in effect, I do not
know what the Mozambique standard is, so I will have to send it
back to get further evidence on that. 5 Doesn't that approach
stand the interest analysis on its head? You are supposed to know
what interests underlie the respective rules before you decide that
one jurisdiction, here Mozambique, has a better claim to applicability than Illinois does. Since the judge did use a blend of the
interest analysis, lex loci, and the most-significant-relationship
approach, I do not see how he could first decide that the law of
that state applies and then start looking to find out what the law
is in that state-not if he wants to use the interest analysis.
53. 22 Cal. 3d 181, 583 P.2d 737, 148 Cal. Rptr. 867 (1978).
54. Pancotto v. Sociedade de Safario de Mozambique, S.A.R.L., 422 F. Supp. 405
(N.D. Ill. 1976).
55. Id. at 409.
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Regarding the other question, damages, it turns out that
Mozambique's statutory law limits damages to sixty-six hundred
contos or some number of contos which works out to $6600. Also,
the Portuguese Code there does not allow for pain and suffering
or disfigurement, or other damages which would be allowable
under Illinois law. The judge held that, under an interest analysis, Illinois law governed those matters. The reason I have discussed Pancotto is this: the defendant, confronted with the possibility that it would have Illinois law applied on the damage question, submitted an affidavit declaring, in effect, we don't have
any insurance, so don't think that somebody with a deep pocket
is going to pay' for this, it's just us. Judge Marshall said the
evidence that there was no insurance came from a lawyer's affidavit; but, since the lawyer had no personal knowledge of the matter, he would disregard it. 6
I do not know many other cases in which there has been an
effort by defendants to prove that there was no insurance. I think
it will be an ugly day if the parties start arguing about how much
insurance the defendant has as a predicate for determining choice
of law. We cannot assume that insurance is going to pay for
everything and say, as my friend just did, the reason it is okay to
impose forum-state liability away from home is that an insurance
company will pay. We would then have to open the door to proof
of insurance. That is not a very entrancing prospect as far as I
am concerned. If we judge from this decision and some others, we
must conclude that Professor Leflar's well-watered plateau of a
few years ago is going downhill.
Concluding, I must add that what Robert Leflar said about
Neumeier and Rosenthal has helped me think about those cases
in dimensions that otherwise would not have been revealed to
me. On that account, too, I am grateful to him.
56. Id. at 411.
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